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In a 5-4 decision, Key v. Doyle (Estate
of French), 98 S. Ct. 280 (1977), the
Supreme Court dismissed an appeal for
lack of jurisdiction because the Court con
cluded that the Mortmain provision of the
D.C. Code which was held unconstitu-
tional by the District of Columbia Court
of Appeals was not a statute of the United
States. Inasmuch as the Supreme Court
never ruled on the merits of the case, an
examination of the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals' decision is appropriate.
MORTMAIN STATUTE
When confronted with the basic issue of
the constitutionality of the D.C. Mortmain
statute, the D.C. Court of Appeals struck
down the statute because it was found ir-
rational and arbitrary.
The facts before the court showed that
a District of Columbia woman executed a
will in which she left one-third of her
residuary estate to the Calvary Baptist
Church and one-third to St. Matthew's
Cathedral. Twenty days after the execu-
tion of the will, the testatrix died. Subse
quently, the executor instituted this suit
seeking a ruling from the Probate Division
of the Superior Court of the District of
Columbia in light of D.C. Code § 18-302
(1973). The code provides: "A devise or
bequest of real or personal property to..
a religious sect, order, or denomination,
or to or for the support, use, or benefit
thereof.., is not valid unless it is made at
least 30 days before the death of the
testator." The purpose of this statute,
commonly known as a "Mortmain
statute," is to invalidate gifts to religious
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institutions and to charities by individuals
who make improvident dispositions in ap-
prehension and contemplation of death.
The salient characterisitc of the provi-
sion in question is the classification
scheme that it establishes. If a testator
devises property to a religious organiza-
tion, and the testator fails to survive the
execution of the will by thirty days, the
devise is null and void. However, as noted
by the lower court in French, "gifts to
charitable, educational and artistic
organizations, even though operated by
religious institutions, have been held to
be beyond the aegis of the statute." Key v.
Doyle (Estate of French) 365 A.2d 621
(D.C. App. 1976). As a result of the D.C.
Code provision, two categories of
beneficiaries developed: one category
consisting of religious devises and be
quests and another category of devises
and bequests to nonreligious benefici-
aries. Since this classification did not in-
volve a "suspect class," the D.C. Court of
Appeals applied the rational relation test
to the case.
Under the rational relation examina-
tion, the court analyzed the statutory
classification to see whether it rationally
related to a legitimate governmental ob-
jective. The court ruled that classifica-
tions created by section 18-302 were ar
bitrary and unreasonable. The law created
a loophole by establishing a distinction
between gifts to religious organizations
and gifts to charitable organizations
owned and operated by religious institu-
tions, with only the latter valid. Key v.
Doyle (Estate of French) 365 A.2d at
624. Since the court found dissimilar
treatment for similarly situated benefici-
aries and no rational relationship between
the law and the governmental objective,
the statute was ruled unconstitutional for
denying the religious legatees the equal
protection-due process guarantees of the
fifth amendment.
As a result of the D.C. Court of Ap-
peals' decision, the testatrix's heirs and
next-of-kin appealed to the Supreme
Court under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §
1257(1) (1970). This provision authorizes
appeals to the Supreme Court in cases
"where is drawn in question the validity
of a ... statute of the United States and
the decision is against its validity." The
Supreme Court, with Mr. Justice Stewart
speaking for the majority, dismissed the
appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction,
based on its determination that the Dis-
trict of Columbia Code provision, applica-
ble only in the district, was not a "statute
of the United States" within the compass
of 28 U.S.C. § 1257(1) (1970). A decision
invalidating a statute of the D.C. Code is
not reviewable by direct appeal to the
Supreme Court, but only by writ of cer-
tiorari in conformance with 28 U.S.C. §
125703 (1970).
In its decision, the Supreme Court out-
lined the ramifications of the District of
Columbia Court Reform and Criminal
Procedure Act of 1970, Pub. L. No.
91-358, 84 Stat. 473 (1970), and the im
pact of the act on the court system in the
District of Columbia. Prior to the act,
decisions rendered by the local courts of
the District of Columbia were appealable
to the United States Court of Appeals.
When the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit invalidated a
state statute, the avenue for the right of
appeal to the Supreme Court was under
28 U.S.C. § 1254 (1970). When the
validity of statutes applicable solely in the
District of Columbia was challenged, ap-
peal to the Supreme Court was only by
writ of certiorari.
The Supreme Court's interpretation of
the 1970 act, which restructured the Dis-
trict of Columbia courts and their jurisdic-
tion, is that the Congress did not intend
the act to enlarge the right of appeal to
the Supreme Court from the courts of the
district. Congress' objective was that the
District of Columbia courts were to be
viewed as state courts and "[aiccordingly
§ 1257, the jurisdictional provision con-
cerning Supreme Court review of state-
court decisions, was amended to include
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
as the highest court of a state." 98 S. Ct.
at 283. Although the D.C. Court of Ap
peals was made equivalent to the "highest
court of a state," there was no indication
that statutes of the D.C. Code were to be
treated as state statutes. See Palmore v.
United States, 411 U.S. 389 (1973).
The majority concluded its decision
stating, by way of analogy, that since
there is no automatic right of appeal to
the Supreme Court when a state court in-
validates a state statute on federal
grounds, likewise, there is no right of ap-
peal when a D.C. court annuls a law ap-
plicable solely to the District of Columbia.
In such cases, review by the Supreme
Court will be carried out by writ of cer-
tiorari in cognizance of section 1257(3).
FOUR DISSENT
Mr. Justice White, joined by Mr. Chief
Justice Burger, Mr. Justice Powell and Mr.
Justice Blackmun, wrote the Court's dis-
senting opinion. The dissent pointed out
that the 1970 District of Columbia Court
Reform and Criminal Procedure Act
shifted the review of D.C. court judg-
ments from section 1254 to section 1257
and, therefore, expanded the Supreme
Court's mandatory appellate jurisdiction.
The dissent stressed that when Congress
amended 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1970), it
could have excluded laws applicable to
the District of Columbia, but since Con-
gress did not, "statutes relating to the
District of Columbia would continue to be
viewed as they have in the past, as
statutes of the United States." 98 S.Ct. at
287.
One implication of the majority's deci
sion is that D.C. Code provisions are in
legalistic limbo. The D.C. statutes have
been uniquely categorized as being
neither statutes of a state nor statutes of
the United States. The dissent noted that
if Congress, with its constitutional power
to legislate for the District of Columbia
under U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, had wanted
such an interpretation of the D.C. Code,
Congress would have made it clear in pre-
vious legislative acts. In summation, Mr.
Justice White's dissent stated that the ma-
jority's narrow construction of the
Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction
based on 28 U.S.C. § 1257 will result in a
lessening of the Court's work load. The
dissent reprimands the majority for enact-
ing self -legislation since an objective of
lessening the work load "should be effec-
tuated by statutory amendment, not
strained construction." 98 S.Ct. at 289.
IMPLICATION OF DECISION
In that the Supreme Court declined to
address the merits of the case before it,
the D.C. Court of Appeals decision, ruling
the district's Mortmain statute unconstitu-
tional, was left intact. Since the Supreme
Court's pronouncement means that no
higher court has reviewed the merits of
the decision of the D.C. Court of Appeals
by either appeal or by writ of certiorari,
more litigation involving Mortmain
statutes is imminent. The Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania in In re Estate of Cavill,
459 Pa. 411, 329 A.2d 503 (1974), ruled
that since the Pennsylvania Mortmain
statute failed to satisfy the rational rela-
tionship test and therefore denied
beneficiaries the equal protection of the
laws, the statute was unconstitutional. Six
other states (Florida, Georgia, Idaho,
Mississippi, Ohio, and Montana) have
Mortmain statutes similar to the District
of Columbia's section 18 302 except that
none of these is restricted to religious be-
quests. Since the states do have power to
regulate testamentary dispositions, the
latest developments must be balanced
against the fact that it is sound public
policy to prevent the testator from mak-
ing improvident dispositions of his prop
erty when he is in a weakened mental con-
dition and is unable to deliberate calmly
the needs of his family.
The Supreme Court is certain to be pre-
sented with the Mortmain statute con-
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